

EXECUTIVE WHITE PAPER

The 90% Before the Proposal

Why Institutions Win or Lose Grants Before a Single Word Is Written

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Grant Readiness Architect™

Evidence-integrated edition | July 2026

Executive Summary

When an institution is disappointed with its grant performance, the response is often immediate and familiar: improve the writing. Strengthen or clarify the methodology. Hire a consultant. Schedule a workshop. Give the proposal one more review.

Those steps can improve a document. They do not necessarily improve the institution that must repeatedly identify, develop, submit, manage, and learn from funded work.

The scale makes that distinction consequential. U.S. colleges and universities reported \$117.7 billion in research and development expenditures in fiscal year 2024.¹ At that level of activity, grant competitiveness cannot be treated as a writing exercise alone.

That distinction is the foundation of what I call **The 90% Rule**:

Grant writing is the last 10%. Organizational readiness is the first 90%.

The percentages are not an audited division of labor. They express sequence and causality. . Long before drafting of the grant proposal begins, leadership has either established external funding as a real priority or left it ambiguous. The institution has either built the infrastructure to support complex work or allowed critical processes to depend on a few people. Funding pursuits are either aligned with a coherent institutional portfolio or driven by whichever opportunity appears next. Collaboration, evaluation, data, internal review, and institutional learning are either part of the operating system or left to improvisation.

Proposal quality still matters. A strong system cannot rescue weak science, poor fit, an unrealistic budget, or unclear writing. But strong writing cannot consistently compensate for an institution that is misaligned, under-supported, fragmented, or unable to demonstrate and manage performance.

This is why a rejected proposal should not automatically trigger another writing intervention. The rejection may be a document-level problem. It may also be the visible symptom of a broader organizational deficiency. Leaders need a way to distinguish between the two.

Institutional grant readiness is the measurable degree to which an institution's leadership, infrastructure, strategic alignment, operational discipline, culture, data and evaluation systems are collectively organized to compete for, win, and sustain externally funded grants and contracts. It is an organizational property, not a judgment about the talent or commitment of any individual.

The **GRANTS Architecture™** organizes that institutional readiness across six dimensions:

- Governance and Leadership
- Research Infrastructure
- Alignment of Strategic Portfolio
- Networking Research Culture
- Team-Oriented Grant Operations
- Systems and Data Infrastructure

These dimensions give executive teams a shared language for examining the system beneath grant activity. They also make an important distinction visible: individual excellence can win a grant, but institutional readiness determines whether success repeats, scales, and lasts.

Before leaders demand more submissions, hire a methodologist or statistician, or prescribe a new initiative, they should establish a readiness baseline. The **Lewis Readiness Index™** provides a fast, executive-level, self-reported baseline of a stakeholder's perceptions across the six GRANTS dimensions. The results are not an audit, compliance review, or complete institutional diagnosis. It is the beginning point for a more informed executive conversation.

The central question is therefore not simply, "How can we write more competitive proposals?"

It is:

Are we building an institution capable of producing competitive proposals repeatedly, without depending on exceptional people to carry the system alone?

1. The Pattern That Changed the Question

My understanding of grant performance changed slowly, then all at once.

Over a 43-year career, I have worked across public agencies and five institutions of higher education as a clinician, administrator, researcher, department chair, academic leader, and dean. I have served in key leadership roles involving more than \$18 million in federal grant activity. I have also watched talented people work extraordinarily hard inside institutions that did not reliably convert that effort into sustained capacity.

At first, I viewed the recurring challenge the way many institutions still do: as a proposal problem. If an application was not funded, the natural questions were about the narrative, the budget, the methodology, the reviewers, or the fit with the opportunity. Those questions were legitimate. They were also incomplete.

The deeper question emerged from observing the patterns of repetition:

Why do the same institutions continue winning while the same institutions continue struggling, even as writers, consultants, faculty members, leaders, and funding priorities change?

If writing talent were the primary institutional variable, outcomes should shift more dramatically when the people holding the pen change. Yet the larger pattern often remains. Some institutions repeatedly turn expertise into competitive submissions, supported awards, renewed funding, and institutional learning. Others produce isolated successes that are difficult to repeat.

The difference is not simply ambition. Nor, is it necessarily the quality of the ideas. The difference is often found in the system surrounding those ideas.

Leadership has or has not made the work a visible priority. Faculty and staff have or have not been given time, support, and clear expectations. Research administration has or has not been positioned and resourced to operate as a strategic function. Data are either available when a proposal requires them or assembled under pressure. Relationships with funders and partners are either cultivated over time or activated only when a deadline appears. Lessons from prior submissions are either captured or lost.

The proposal is where institutional readiness becomes visible. It is not where readiness begins.

That realization changed the question from "How do we improve this application?" to "What kind of institution repeatedly produces competitive applications?"

The second question does not replace the first. It becomes the first question, correcting the sequence.

2. The Great Grant-Writing Misdiagnosis

Institutions focus on grant writing for understandable reasons.

The proposal is visible. It has a deadline, an identifiable author, a budget, a set of reviewer comments, and a clear outcome. When it is declined, leaders can point to a document and ask what should be changed. Writing help is also easy to purchase. A workshop can be scheduled. A consultant can review the problem, the method, the statistics, the narrative. A template can be distributed. Action is immediate and observable.

The organizational system beneath the proposal is harder to see.

No single document reveals whether leadership priorities are aligned across the president's office, academic affairs, finance, research administration, and the schools or departments expected to perform the work. Reviewer comments do not show whether faculty had protected time, whether internal approvals were delayed, whether data were available, whether the institution had cultivated the right partnership, or whether the grants office was carrying a workload beyond its practical capacity.

A rejected proposal has an author. An absent institutional system does not.

This visibility gap can lead institutions to treat the symptom they can see while leaving the root cause untouched. They invest in writing assistance because the final document is tangible, even when the more important constraint may sit upstream in the institutional infrastructure.

The upstream burden is measurable. In the Federal Demonstration Partnership's 2018 survey (a partnership between federal grant funding agencies and academic institutions to reduce administrative burden on researchers and their supporting organizations), 11,167 principal investigators at 111 member institutions estimated that administrative and related requirements (i.e., non-research related busy work) consumed an average of 44.3% of the time allocated to federally funded research projects. The same survey found that 31% believed increasing administrative workload was discouraging them from submitting federal proposals.² These are self-reported perceptions, the respondents were concentrated at very-high-research institutions, and the findings make clear that the environment surrounding work directly related to external funding can materially constrain participation.

Proposal-focused interventions often cannot correct:

- inconsistent executive sponsorship;
- unclear institution-based funding priorities;
- fragmented pre-award and post-award operations;
- limited coordination among academic, fiscal, research office, and institutional-data functions;
- dependence on a small number of principal investigators or administrators;
- weak mechanisms for mentorship and interdisciplinary team formation;
- insufficient access to credible outcomes data and evaluation capacity;
- inconsistent pre-submission proposal review protocols, or
- the absence of a disciplined process for learning from prior submissions.

None of this makes writing unimportant. Strong proposals require clear scientific thinking, a sufficient knowledge gap to be a researchable problem, sound methodology, realistic budgets, a qualified implementation team, and a

persuasive presentation. The misdiagnosis occurs when leaders assume that deficits in the visible final product (i.e., the finished grant proposal) is the locus of the entire problem.

Better writing can improve one submission. Better institutional readiness can enhance the conditions under which every submission is produced.

That Federal Demonstration Partnership's 2018 survey helps explain why institutional support matters: respondents most often identified administrative personnel, financial-management assistance, and proposal-preparation support beyond writing the grant narrative as the practices most helpful in reducing unnecessary burden.²

3. The 90% Rule

The 90% Rule states:

Grant writing is the last 10%. Organizational readiness is the first 90%.




Figure 1. The 90% Rule expresses sequence and causality. The percentages do not result from an audited division of labor.

The idea is best understood as a sequence.

Before a proposal team begins drafting a grant narrative, the institution has already made a series of consequential decisions. It has decided, explicitly or implicitly, whether external funding is part of its strategy. It has established how priorities are selected, who may commit institutional resources, how proposals move through review, how partnerships are managed, whether staff and faculty have enough support, and how data will be produced to demonstrate need and impact.

Those choices form the foundation beneath the proposal.

A system's perspective is consistent with this sequence. The National Research Council has described the research enterprise as an interconnected system in which workforce, resources, infrastructure, management, environment, and peer review interact; changing one component without considering the others may not produce the intended result.⁵ The 90% Rule applies that system's logic to institutional grant readiness. It does not claim that outside research mathematically proves a 90/10 allocation. Rather, it maintains that institutional infrastructure readiness is far more important than a completed and submitted grant proposal.

The last 10% includes the demanding work attached to a particular opportunity: interpreting the notice, shaping the scientific response, crafting the narrative, developing the budget, assembling required materials, confirming compliance, and submitting a coherent application. This stage of work mandates expertise. However, it is simply too late in the sequence to repair every institutional weakness upon which a proposal's ultimate success rests.

Consider a building metaphor. The lobby is visible, public, and easy to judge. The foundation is unseen. A more attractive lobby can improve the experience of entering the building, but it cannot correct an unstable structure underneath it.

Grant writing is the lobby. Institutional readiness is the foundation.

This is also why readiness should be treated as institutional capacity rather than institutional luck. A gifted principal investigator may overcome weak systems once, twice, maybe three times. An experienced administrator may rescue a proposal under an impossible deadline. A committed dean may hold a fragile process together through personal Herculean intervention. These successes matter, but they can conceal risk at a foundational level.

When success depends on heroics, the institution does not own the capacity. The heroic individual does.

The organizational test is whether the work can continue when that person is unavailable, changes roles, or leaves. Durable capacity exists in leadership commitments, documented processes, appropriate staffing, shared knowledge, aligned incentives, reliable data, and an institutional culture that supports participation.

The first 90% is therefore not a dismissal of proposal craft. It is the work required to make proposal craft productive, repeatable, and sustainable.

4. The Hidden Costs of Institutional Unreadiness

The most visible cost of unreadiness is a declined proposal. It may not be the largest cost.

Unreadiness can prevent an institution from reaching the submission stage at all. A promising opportunity may be abandoned because the institution cannot assemble the right team, approve a commitment, produce required data, develop a competitive budget, or complete internal review on time. Because no proposal is submitted, the lost opportunity may never appear in a formal performance report.

The cost can also appear in the behavior of talented people. Faculty and staff who repeatedly encounter unclear processes, slow decisions, inadequate support, or unrewarded effort may reduce their participation. New investigators may conclude that grant activity is reserved for a small group of insiders. Experienced researchers may protect their work by building around the institution rather than through it. A grants office may become a permanent crisis-response unit rather than a strategic partner.

These are not merely morale concerns. They are capacity concerns.

Unreadiness can create several forms of institutional risk:

Financial risk. Viable opportunities may never be pursued, current awards may be difficult to renew, and external funding may remain concentrated in too few sources.

Talent risk. Productive researchers, administrators, and leaders may experience unsustainable workload, stress, or burnout when the institution depends on their personal effort without building the system around them. Those pressures can contribute to attrition, although decisions to leave are rarely explained by one factor alone.

Strategic risk. A strategic plan may promise research growth or expanded external funding without connecting that ambition to staffing, infrastructure, incentives, priorities, and accountability.

Operational risk. Delayed approvals, fragmented systems, unclear ownership, and weak handoffs can threaten submission quality and the institution's ability to manage work after an award.

Reputational risk. Partners and funders experience the institution not only through its ideas, but through its responsiveness, reliability, reporting, and execution.

Learning risk. When reviewer feedback, submission history, outcome data, and implementation lessons are not captured institutionally, the next team begins again from memory.

The research-administration workforce illustrates this fragility. A 2025 national workload study by Woodward and Roberts drew on 2,441 survey responses across diverse institution types and found that heavy workload, limited advancement opportunities, and inadequate compensation were leading causes of attrition. It also documented more than 1,200 distinct job titles, underscoring the lack of standardization that can weaken role clarity and continuity.³

Post-award risk is equally concrete. In a 2023 audit of Saint Louis University's management of NIH awards, the HHS Office of Inspector General found that 6 of 31 judgmentally selected costs, totaling \$42,578, did not comply with federal award requirements. The audit attributed the errors to inadequate controls at the institution and recommended stronger procedures, internal review of claimed costs, and improved subrecipient monitoring.⁴ This is one institutional audit, not a national prevalence estimate. Its value is illustrative: winning an award creates obligations that weak systems may not be prepared to manage.

These risks compound because the six dimensions of readiness interact. A culture problem may begin as a leadership decision about workload. A data problem may originate in fragmented infrastructure. A weak funder relationship may reflect an unclear portfolio rather than an absence of networking skill.

The visible symptoms and the root cause are not always located in the same place.

This is why prescribing a solution before establishing a baseline is so dangerous. The institution can spend significant time and money correcting the wrong problem with great professionalism.

5. The GRANTS Architecture™

The GRANTS Architecture™ provides an executive framework for examining institutional readiness without reducing the issue to one office, one proposal, or one person. Each dimension answers a different organizational question.

The GRANTS Architecture™ is my proprietary executive framework. It should not be described as empirically proven, and the Lewis Readiness Index™ should not be represented as an externally validated psychometric instrument. External research is, however, consistent with the underlying assumption in the Index, that grant acquisition performance depends on interconnected people, resources, infrastructure, operations, culture, and data systems rather than on a single component.⁵

G — Governance and Leadership

Definition: The extent to which leadership communicates, prioritizes, resources, and protects external funding as an institutional responsibility and priority.

Executive question: Does leadership consistently communicate, prioritize, resource, and protect the institution's external-funding agenda?

An example weakness can be a strategic plan that calls for research growth without named accountability, regular executive attention, or a credible resource path.

Why it matters: leadership does not simply set strategy. Leadership sets permission. What leaders visibly support, review, resource, and protect becomes institutionally possible. What they leave ambiguous is easily displaced by more immediate alternative demands.

R — Research Infrastructure

Definition: The staffing, processes, technology, systems, and operational capacity required to support proposal development and manage funded work.

Executive question: Can the institution identify, prepare, submit, manage, and sustain funded work without relying on last-minute heroics?

An example weakness can look like essential knowledge concentrated in one administrator, disconnected tracking systems, or routine submission pressure created by unclear handoffs.

Why it matters: infrastructure determines whether strategic intent can be executed. An institution may identify the right opportunity and assemble a strong team yet still be unable to move the work reliably from concept through submission and award management.

Research administrators manage the compliance, fiscal, and operational responsibilities that enable faculty to focus on research. The national workload study by Woodward and Roberts conducted in 2025, described above, connects turnover and inconsistent role structures to reduced institutional efficiency, rendering staffing stability and role clarity matters of research infrastructure rather than back-office convenience.³

A — Alignment of Strategic Portfolio

Definition: The degree to which the pursuit of funding connects to institutional priorities, capabilities, disciplines, partnerships, and long-term strategy.

Executive question: Are funding pursuits connected to defined institutional priorities, capabilities, disciplines, and long-term strategy?

An example weakness can manifest as multiple units chasing the same opportunity or one unit chasing disparate opportunities because no institution-level process exists for deciding where to target limited time and support.

Why it matters: alignment turns activity into a portfolio. It helps leaders distinguish between an available opportunity and the right opportunity, and it gives the institution a basis to sustain funder and partner relationships.

N — Networking Research Culture

Definition: The quality of external relationships and the degree to which internal discipline exists to develop, review, and report the outcomes of funded work.

Executive question: Does the institution maintain strong external relationships and dependable internal processes for pursuing opportunities?

A weakness can materialize as starting engagement with funders near a deadline, or inconsistent coordination with partners.

Why it matters: funders and external collaborators experience the institution through its operations. Reliability, responsiveness, review quality, and relationship stewardship affect whether a strong idea becomes a credible commitment to the institution by an external partner.

One University of California, San Francisco program provides a useful illustration. During a reported 12-month period, 44% of proposals that received the program's internal scientific pre-submission review were subsequently funded.⁶ That result comes from a single department-level program and may reflect selection effects as well as review quality; it should not be treated as a universal forecast. It, however, shows how disciplined internal review can be organized as an institutional practice rather than left to chance.

T — Team-Oriented Operations

Definition: The institutional environment that supports collaboration, mentoring, participation, recognition, and shared responsibility for grant success.

Executive question: Does the culture reward collaboration, mentoring, participation, recognition, and shared responsibility for grant success?

A weakness can be grant activity concentrated among a few overextended people, junior faculty navigating the process alone, or collaboration occurring only through personal relationships.

Why it matters: culture determines whether capacity broadens or remains fragile. Institutions build durable participation when people recognize the expectation that grant submissions will occur, and that grant activity comes with support, recognition, and connects to meaningful institutional priorities.

In 2011, the Duke University School of Medicine developed a faculty mentoring program called Path to Independence. Its aim was to pair senior faculty mentors with expertise and experience in grant writing with early career assistant professors to develop them into stronger NIH grant principal investigators. In addition to structured mentoring, some of the strategies deployed were workshops, working in peer groups, and strong internal review of any grant proposal before submission. Participants in the Path to Independence Program achieved a 28% funding rate with NIH grant applications, compared with an 11% 2010 baseline for Duke junior faculty who did not participate in the Path to Independence program.⁷ This single-institution result does not establish what every university should expect. It does demonstrate that structured support can create conditions in which junior faculty are better positioned to compete.

S — Systems and Data Infrastructure

Definition: The institution's ability to produce, manage, analyze, and use credible data to demonstrate need, assess outcomes, meet funder reporting expectations, and improve future performance.

Executive question: Can the institution produce credible data, evaluate outcomes, learn from submissions, and demonstrate impact?

A weakness can present as outcome data scattered in an unstructured manner across programs, evaluation expertise added too late, or reviewer feedback provided without a structured debrief to ensure identification of key takeaway lessons.

Why it matters: data and evaluation allow the institution to make a credible case, demonstrate performance, and learn key lessons based on data in a structured and intentional manner, i.e., engage in data-driven decision making. Without institutional memory anchored in data, each new grant submission risks repeating problems the institution has already paid to discover.

The GRANTS dimensions should not be treated as six independent categories. They form a holistic architecture. A weakness in one dimension can suppress strength in another. The purpose of the framework is not to create six

new initiatives. It is to help leaders understand the system well in its entirety enough to identify where attention should begin.

This discussion also benefits from structural context. This means that not all academic institutions share the same readiness to successfully acquire external funding. For example, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other minority-serving institutions often operate within campus environments shaped by historical underinvestment, limited infrastructure, and inadequate access to research support. A 2025 survey study of HBCU investigators identified campus challenges related to external funding, and those challenges were things like weak institutional infrastructure to compete for grant funding, excessive administrative burden, high workloads – especially teaching loads, lack of mentoring, and minimal targeted research support tailored towards securing external funding.⁸ The survey had a 15% response rate, so the findings should be treated with caution due to limited generalizability. Nevertheless, institutional readiness is the major part of an ecosystem inclined towards external funding success.

6. Why Individual Excellence Is Not Institutional Capacity

Success in higher education requires some exceptional people. The problem begins when an institution mistakes individual effort for its own capacity.

One successful principal investigator is not the same as a productive institutional pipeline. One knowledgeable administrator is not the same as a documented operating system. One energetic dean is not the same as durable governance. One funded proposal is not the same as repeatable competitiveness.

Individual excellence is valuable. It is also mobile.

When knowledge and performance live primarily in one person, the institution is vulnerable. When funder relationships belong to an individual rather than the institution, continuity is uncertain. When one administrator must rescue every proposal, growth becomes impossible without exhaustion. When collaboration depends on personal goodwill, it may disappear during leadership turnover or budget pressure.

The workforce evidence reinforces this point. When research-administration roles are inconsistent and turnover is driven by excessive workload, limited advancement, and poor compensation, the institution risks losing not only an employee but also accumulated process knowledge, relationships, and judgment.³

Institutional capacity is what remains when the exceptional person is no longer on the institution's payroll.

Such capacity appears in clear decision norms, documented processes, realistic workloads, redundant knowledge, consistent review, accessible data, shared priorities, succession planning, and a culture that enables people, not individuals to succeed.

The goal is not to replace individual excellence with bureaucracy. It is to build an environment in which excellence can multiply.

Individual excellence can win a grant. Institutional readiness determines whether success repeats, scales, and lasts.

7. Leadership Sets the Ceiling

Every dimension of readiness is influenced by leadership because each requires decisions that operating units cannot make for themselves.

Leadership establishes priorities. If external funding is strategically important, that importance must appear in plans, budgets, expectations, calendars, reporting, and executive attention.

Leadership communicates permission. People need to know there is an expectation for grant activity to occur and not merely be praised after a win. Permission becomes credible when leaders protect time, remove barriers, and remain engaged before the award announcement.

Leadership allocates resources. Infrastructure, staffing, data systems, evaluation capacity, mentoring, and partnership development all compete with other institutional needs. Without executive choices that support the availability of resources, the grants office is left to manage ambition in a resource vacuum.

Leadership defines accountability. External funding is not solely the responsibility of the sponsored-programs office. Academic affairs, finance, institutional research, advancement, department leadership, and executive offices may all hold part of the system; and therefore, responsibility. Leadership determines whether those parts operate together.

Leadership recognizes contribution. Campus culture shapes what an institution notices, rewards, protects, and celebrates. Recognition alone is not sufficient, but silence communicates its own priority.

Leadership confronts gaps. A readiness baseline may reveal differences between executive perception and operating reality. It may show that a favored solution does not address the most consequential constraint. Mature leadership treats that information as an opportunity for institutional enhancement, not as an indictment of a department or individual.

This is why leadership sets the ceiling. The statement is not an accusation. It is a description of authority.

The grants office cannot independently create protected faculty time, change advancement criteria, align a portfolio across schools, connect institutional research to funding strategy, or make grant performance a board-level concern. Those are leadership decisions.

When leadership provides visible permission, resources, coordination, and accountability, the dimensions of institutional readiness can mature. When it does not, technical improvements remain isolated and unaddressed.

8. Five Questions Every Executive Team Should Ask

1. Could we respond competitively if the right major funding opportunity appeared tomorrow?

This question tests the difference between aspiration and operational readiness. The issue is not whether the institution could submit something. It is whether leadership, faculty, research administration, finance, partners, data, and review processes could produce a credible response without destabilizing other work.

2. Are our funding pursuits aligned with a defined institutional portfolio?

A portfolio creates a basis for choosing. It connects funding activity to strategy, capabilities, disciplines, community needs, priority populations, partnerships, and long-term institutional identity. Without that alignment, effort can increase while competitiveness may not.

3. Are we building institutional capacity, or depending on a few exceptional people?

Executives should identify where success depends on personal memory, informal relationships, extraordinary overtime, or one faculty's continued presence. These conditions may generate results today while creating significant continuity risk tomorrow.

4. Do our data and evaluation systems support credible proposals and funded performance?

Leaders should know whether the institution can quickly produce reliable need, implementation, and impact data; involve evaluation expertise early; meet reporting requirements; and convert feedback into learning.

5. Have we objectively examined our institution's readiness to compete?

Strategic ambition is not the baseline. Neither are isolated wins, anecdotes, or the competence of one office. Leaders need a shared view of current conditions before they can determine the need for deeper examination or investment.

9. From Assumption to Measurement

The **Lewis Readiness Index™** (LRI) was created to provide that first baseline.

The LRI is an executive-level, self-reported readiness assessment. It captures how an institutional stakeholder perceives current conditions across the six GRANTS dimensions. Used with multiple leaders, it can also surface areas of agreement and disagreement that merit further conversation.

The LRI helps leaders:

- establish a fast, high-level readiness baseline;
- use a shared language across academic and administrative functions;
- examine perceptions across all six dimensions rather than focusing only on proposal writing;
- identify areas that may require closer attention; and
- begin a more disciplined executive conversation about institutional capacity.

Its boundaries are equally important.

The LRI is not an audit, a compliance review, an external validation, or a comprehensive institutional diagnosis. It does not independently verify every reported condition. It does not determine why a particular proposal won or lost. It does not, by itself, establish root cause or produce fully substantiated institutional recommendations.

Those deeper conclusions require additional evidence, i.e., leadership interviews, supporting documents, and closer examination of the institutional conditions behind the baseline.

This distinction protects the integrity of the process. A baseline should not pretend to be a complete answer. Its purpose is to replace an unexamined assumption with a clearer starting point.

Readiness is also not a permanent grade. It is a changeable institutional condition. The value of measurement is not the label it produces; it is the quality of the decisions that become possible once leaders can see the system more clearly.

Conclusion

Institutions should understand the system expected to support grant activity before demanding more submissions, hiring another writer, or scheduling another workshop.

The proposal matters. It is where strategy, science, budget, evidence, partnership, and persuasion must come together. But the conditions that allow those elements to come together must be established long before the first draft. That is the 90% before the proposal.

Better proposal writing can strengthen one submission. Better institutional readiness changes what the institution can produce repeatedly.

The leadership question is not whether talented people can occasionally succeed despite a flawed system. Some do. The question is whether the institution is willing to build a system worthy of their talent.

How ready is your institution?

The **Lewis Readiness Index™** provides a fast, executive-level baseline across the six dimensions of institutional grant readiness.

Complete the Lewis Readiness Index™

It takes approximately 15 minutes.

Establish the baseline and have a full discussion to accurately diagnose the current institutional infrastructure readiness before prescribing the solution.

Start Your Assessment Now: <https://grantreadinessarchitect.com/lri/start>

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Website: GrantReadinessArchitect.com

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About Dr. Allen Lewis

Dr. Allen Lewis is the Grant Readiness Architect™. His 43-year career spans health, behavioral health, public administration, teaching, research, and academic leadership across five institutions of higher education. He has held key leadership roles involving more than \$18 million in federal grant activity and is the author or co-author of more than 80 peer-reviewed publications and book chapters, with more than 150 invited and peer-reviewed presentations. His work focuses on helping institutional leaders examine and build the organizational conditions required to compete for, win, and sustain external funding.

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